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CHAPTER 6 
Equity and Equity Practice 
LEO A. REED 
In examining the decisions of our Supreme Judicial Court during 
the survey year, it will be found that most of the cases were decided 
upon fundamental principles earlier laid down by the Court. In cer-
tain cases, however, the Court was presented with the opportunity to 
clarify and point out the correct interpretation of previous decisions. 
The equitable doctrine of specific performance has again been drawn 
into controversy. The "ghost of mutuality" has walked again. In an 
illuminating decision the Court once more examined the doctrines of 
"mutuality of obligation" and "mutuality of remedy" in the field of 
specific performance as they may exist in Massachusetts. It may be 
that this decision will put an end to the issue of mutuality in this field 
of law. 
A statute was passed by the General Court in an attempt to clarify 
the law of the state in regard to specific performance of contracts 
concerning personal property. 
There were also a number of decisions in equity to review the action 
of administrative agencies. These are discussed in Chapter 14, Admin-
istrative Law. 
/§6.1. Specific performance: The problems. The principles upon 
which the law of specific performance is grounded in this Common-
wealth are more or less firmly fixed. In respect to land the principles, 
in the main, follow the decided weight of authority as found in most 
jurisdictions. The general rule is that contracts for the purchase and 
sale of real estate are specifically enforceable unless some special 
ground in the particular case warrants a denial of enforcement'! In 
cases involving the purchase and sale of personal property, however, 
more difficulty arises. It will be found that relief in these cases has 
been greatly restricted.2 The recent restrictions have resulted in mo-
tivating a legislative enactment substantially affecting the remedy of 
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§6.1. '0lszewski v. Sardynski, 316 Mass. 715, 56 N.E.2d 607 (1944); Noyes v. 
Bragg, 220 Mass. 106, 107 N.E. 669 (1915). 
2 Poltorack v. Jackson Chevrolet Co., 322 Mass. 699, 79 N.E.2d 285 (1948). 
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specific performance.s Likewise, in the decisions, the Court would 
seem to have banished from Massachusetts forever the ghost of the 
doctrine of mutuality in specific performance cases.4 In the following 
sections more consideration will be given to these topics. 
§6.2. Specific performance: Personal property, the cases, and a new 
statutory remedy. In this state the doctrine of specific performance 
in respect to contracts to deliver chattels or other personal property has 
been in large measure quite restricted in scope. The fact that such 
property may be acquired in the open market has led to the denial of 
relief. It has been deemed that an action for damages provides an 
adequate remedy. Thus, a contract for the sale of an automobile 
by the defendant was refused performance in Poltorak v. Jackson 
Chevrolet CO.l Where specific performance has been decreed, it will 
be found that the chattel or personal property was unique or not 
readily obtainable in the open market. And a contract for the sale 
of shares of stock in a closely held corporation, limited in amount or 
not readily obtainable in the open market, may be enforced.2 
In Dahlstrom Metallic Door Co. v. Evatt Construction Co.} the 
Court decreed specific performance of an agreement by a subcontractor 
to deliver certain materials needed in the construction of a building. 
It is to be noted, however, that the materials were already fabricated, 
were difficult to replace in the open market, and the lack of these 
materials was delaying completion of the construction contract. 
And then, in the now quite famous Jackson Chevrolet case, cited 
above, the Court laid down the test of whether or not damages were 
the "equivalent of performance." The Court said: "The test to de-
termine whether or not specific performance should be granted is the 
same in the case of contracts for the sale of personalty as in the case 
of contracts for the sale of real estate, namely whether damages for 
.. the breach are or are not the equivalent of the promised performance.4 
In view of these limitations placed on the remedy of specific per-
formance, the General Court in 1954 enacted the following statute: 
The fact that the plaintiff has a remedy at law for damages shall 
not bar a suit in equity for specific performance of a contract, other 
than one for purely personal services, if the court finds that no 
other existing remedy, or the damages recoverable thereby, is in 
fact..the equivalent of the performance..~~·::::!!{ the contract 
relie.d:IUi.lW .. dxe plain liE£;.AAi di€--COUlT1ffily ~r specific per-
formance if it finds such remedy to E,(,!E!acticable. If performance 
is not decreed, damages may"oe"aet:ermined in the proceeding, and 
• Acts of 1954, c. 439, §1, inserting §IA in C.L. c. 214. 
• Morad v. Silva, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 103, 117 N.E.2d 290 (1954). 
§6.2. 1322 Mass. 699, 79 N.E.2d 285 (1948). 
2 Legro v. Kelley, 311 Mass. 674, 42 N.E.2d 836 (1924). 
3256 Mass. 404, 152 N.E. 715 (1926). 
4322 Mass. 699, 700, 79 N.E.2d 285, 286 (1948). 
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if the defendant claims a jury on that issue, the Issue shall be 
framed and referred for jury tria1.5 
EQUITY AND EQUITY PRACTICE 59 
I No judicial interpretation of this statute has been made up to the 
j time of this writing. It would seem that the court may grant specific 
1 performance if the remedy is practicable. If not, the court may retain 
the bill for assessment of damages. In the past the court has retained 
cases for assessment of damages where no question of the right to a 
trial by jury was raised.6 There exists no constitutional right to a 
trial by jury in a bill for specific performance.7 However, where the 
remedy of specific performance is denied and the bill retained to assess 
damages, the defendant may be entitled as of right to a jury trial on 
issue.S 
statute preserves this right of trial by jury to the defendant. 
~Under the recognized practice of framing jury issues no difficulty should 
i"esJllt if a jury is claimed. 
/§6.3. Specific performance: Mutuality of obligation. The doctrine 
of mutuality was again raised in a recent case brought to compel spe-
cific performance of a contract to sell real and personal property. In 
Morad v. Silva I the parties entered into an agreement under seal for 
the sale of both real and personal property. In answer to the defend-
ants' contention that the plaintiff failed to furnish sufficient considera-
tion for the defendants' promise, the Court said that, the agreement 
being under seal, no further consideration was required. 
The defendants further contended that specific performance should 
be denied because "there was no mutuality of obligation." The Court 
in answer to this contention pointed out that mutuality of obligation 
is of importance only in determining whether a valid bilateral contract 
founded on good consideration has been entered into by the parties.2 
It has no bearing on the question as to whether specific performance 
shall or shall not be granted. In some of the earlier cases there exists 
an intimation that equity refuses specific performance where there is 
no mutuality of obligation. In the 1924 case of Forman v. Gadollas,3 
the Court in discussing the principles of specific performance stated: 
The general principle undoubtedly is that equity refuses specific 
performance of contracts where there is no mutuality of obliga-
tion. . .. But that principle is not applicable to contracts un-
enforceable against the plaintiff under the statute of frauds in suits 
for specific performance against a defendant who has bound him-
self by signing a memorandum sufficient under that statute. The 
5 Acts of 1954, c. 439, §1, inserting §IA in C.L., c. 214. 
• See Newburyport Institution for Savings v. Puffer, 201 Mass. 41, 47, 87 N.E. 562. 
565 (1909). 
7 Shapiro v. D'Arcy, 180 Mass. 370, 62 N.E. 412 (1902). 
• Stockbridge v. Mixer, 215 Mass. 415,102 N.E. 646 (1913). 
§6.3. '1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 103, 117 N.E.2d 290 (1954). 
2 Bernstein v. W.B. Manufacturing Co., 238 Mass. 589, 131 N.E. 200 (1921). 
3247 Mass. 207, 142 N.E. 87. 
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bringing of suit by the plaintiff is proof of his assent to the agree-
ment and establishes mutuality. There is thus a mutual contract, 
although the proof as to the defendant is expressed by signature 
to a writing, while that as to the plaintiff rests upon oral evidence 
and on the admissions of his bil1.4 
It is to be noted however, that what the Court really had in mind was 
the want of a mutuality of remedy. 
It is true that some courts have laid down the principle that, in 
order for a party to be entitled to specific performance, there must be 
mutuality of remedy at the time the contract is made. This principle i 
is no longer accepted by modern authorities.5 In the Morad case, the ' 
Court, stating the present law of this Commonwealth, said: 
The modern rule is that "the fact that the remedy of specific 
enforcement is not available to one party is not sufficient reason 
for refusing it to the other party." Restatement: Contracts, 
§372(1). The trend of our decisions is not at variance with this 
rule and we accept it as the law of this Commonwealth. [Cases 
cited.] We are mindful that there is language in a few of our de-
cisions which tends to support the mutuality doctrine. [Cases 
cited.] To the extent that these can be considered authority for 
the doctrine we are not disposed to follow them.6 
While it was said that specific performance is not a matter of right, the 
Court was cognizant of the fact that in some instances the remedy may 
involve difficulties and performance may be refused. Having this in 
mind the Court said that specific performance may be refused " 'if a 
substantial part of the agreed exchange for the performance to be 
compelled is as yet unperformed and its concurrent or future perform-
ance is not well secured to the satisfaction of the court.' "7 The Court 
then asserted, "We have discussed the mutuality doctrine at consider-
able length because, despite the fact that most of our decisions are in 
harmony with the modern rule, the ghost of mutuality still walks and, 
until laid, will continue to haunt our law." 8 
In the Morad case performance was decreed, requiring the plaintiff 
to perform all conditions of the agreement upon performance by the 
defendant. 
§6.4. Dissolution of corporations. The dissolution of corporations, 
like their creation, is a matter of legislative cognizance. A corporation 
may be dissolved only in the manner set forth in the General Laws, 
Chapter 155, Section 50. In Rizzuto v. Onset Cafe, Inc.,! the adminis-
• 247 Mass. at 214, 142 N.E. at 90. 
o Walsh, A Treatise on Equity §68 (1930). 
6 Morad v. Silva, 1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. 103, 107-108, 117 N.E.2d 290,293. 
"1954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 108, 117 N.E.2d, at 293, quoting Restatement of Contracts 
§373 (1932). 
81954 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 108, 117 N.E.2d at 293. 
§6.4. '330 Mass. 595, 116 N.E.2d 349 (1953). 
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trator of the estate of a stockholder filed a bill in equity to determine 
ownership of one share of stock and in addition prayed for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to distribute the assets of the corporation. In revers-
ing the decree of the trial court, granting relief as to the distribution 
of the corporate assets, the Court said, "The general equity jurisdic-
tion of courts does not extend to distributing the assets of a corpora-
tion merely because need for its continued existence is not apparent." 2 
The decree for the distribution of the assets was tantamount to a dis-
solution of the corporation and beyond the power of the court. It thus 
followed that the bill could not be maintained either for the distribu-
tion of the assets or the appointment of a receiver. 
§6.5. Equity practice. While several of the recent cases involve 
questions of practice, they require no special comment in view of the 
fact that they followed the practice established in earlier decisions. 
One case, however, may call for some discussion as to when the 
court should exercise its discretion in allowing an amendment to 
a bill. In McDade v. Moynihan 1 the Supreme Judicial Court, on 
appeal from a final decree, exercised its discretion and directed that 
an amendment denied in the trial court be allowed. The amendment 
was to the effect that since the commencement of the suit, the plaintiff 
had secured a judgment against the defendant in Pennsylvania for the 
amount claimed in the Massachusetts suit. 
It appeared from the facts of the case that the parties executed an 
agreement in Pennsylvania whereby the defendants agreed to buy from 
the plaintiff all of the capital stock of a corporation together with cer-
tain so-called judgment notes of the corporation for an agreed price. 
The bill alleged that the defendants failed to pay certain installments 
of the purchase price. The bill further alleged that the defendants 
had broken another provision of the agreement whereby they war-
ranted that the accumulated outstanding bills and expenses of the 
corporation should not be in excess of $2500. 
The trial court denied a motion to amend the bill, as pointed out 
above. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the trial court and al-
lowed the amendment by what it termed "simple amendment." Under 
the older practice, it was necessary to make this amendment by a 
supplemental bill. The Court then ordered the entering of an inter-
locutory decree allowing the motion and the modification of the final 
decree to require the defendant to pay the unpaid balance of the Penn-
sylvania judgment with any unpaid interest thereon according to the 
law of Pennsylvania, instead of the sum named in the prior final decree. 
The decision is clearly sound. The fact that after the suit in equity 
was instituted a cause of action included therein has been reduced to 
judgment in another state should not bar amendment. It is technically 
true that a cause of action based on a judgment is a different cause of 
action than that based on the original cause. In equity, however, the 
• 330 Mass. at 597. 116 N.E.2d at 250. 
§6.5. 1330 Mass. 437. 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953). 
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rule on amendments is broader than it may be at law. Under equity 
practice a cause of action asserted in the bill and later reduced to 
judgment may be the subject of an amendment; the final decree can 
then be entered to correspond to the existing facts and settle the entire 
controversy. The Supreme Judicial Court, having "on appeal" all of 
the powers of amendment of the court below,2 thus allowed the amend-
ment and the modification of the final decree without the necessity of 
returning the case to the lower court. 
• G.L., c. 231, §125. 
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